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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a dynamic general equilibrium framework with
an explicit investment-ﬁnancing constraint. The constraint is intended as
a reduced form to capture the balance sheet eﬀects that have been widely
regarded as an important determinant of ﬁnancial crises. We derive a link
b e t w e e nt h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm and social welfare. We ﬁnd that the value
of the ﬁrm can be greater with the constraint. Our model also sheds light
on how the eﬀects of productivity shocks and investors’ misperception of
productivity shocks may be ampliﬁed by the ﬁnancing constraint.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C61, D92
Keywords: Investment Constraint, Value of the Firm
1International Monetary Fund and University of Hong Kong, respectively. We thank
the Hong Kong Research Grants Councils for ﬁnancial support. We appreciate comments
from Andrew Feltenstein, Eduardo Ley, Rodney Ramcharan, Reza Vaez-Zadeh, an anony-
mous referee and the Editor, Robert Flood.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
At the very beginning of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis (AFC), most people took
it as yet another currency crisis and many viewed it to belong to the second
generation (self-fulﬁlling) type àl aObstfeld (1996) rather than ﬁrst gen-
eration (fundamental) type àl aKrugman (1979). As the crisis unfolded,
however, it became obvious that, unlike exchange rate crises, the AFC was
more related to banking and ﬁnancial problems in the process of ﬁnancing
business investment. Since then, quite a few theories (so-called ‘third genera-
tion’ models) have been proposed to understand its sources–moral hazard or
guaranteed bailouts (Krugman 1998), ﬁnancial fragility (Chang and Velasco
2000), and balance sheet eﬀects (Krugman 1999).2
As Krugman (2001) concludes, balance sheet eﬀects are now believed
to be the most crucial element behind the AFC. In particular, if ﬁrms are
highly leveraged with debt denominated in foreign currency, then anything
that triggers a massive capital outﬂow will result in a depreciation of the
domestic currency and thus an increase in the ﬁrms’ debt burden. As a
consequence, net worth of the ﬁrms will be reduced, limiting their ability to
borrow to ﬁnance their new investment. The resulting investment and output
collapse will validate the capital ﬂight and make the crisis self-fulﬁlling.
Despite its general acceptance by the profession as an important deter-
minant of ﬁnancial crises, the balance sheet eﬀect has been studied mostly
in models with complicated banking structure and multiple types of agents.
For studies of ﬁrms’ balance sheet eﬀect on business cycle, see Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). For a growth
analysis that incorporates banks’ balance sheet eﬀect, see Chakraborty and
Ray (2001). The balance sheet eﬀect has also been embedded in the study
of the bank capital channel of monetary policy (see Van den Heuvel 2001,
Kashyap and Stein 1995, Chami and Cosimano 2001). A related set of papers
that emphasize the role of durable assets as collateral include Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Chen (2001).
In this paper, we provide a dynamic general equilibrium framework with
an inﬁnitely long-lived representative agent. We impose an explicit investment-
ﬁnancing constraint that is intended as a reduced form to capture the bal-
ance sheet eﬀects. At the expense of microfoundations, our approach has
2See Schneider and Tornell (2000) for an attempt to synthesize some of these eﬀects.
2the advantage of simplicity. We think of our contribution as similar to that
of money-in-utility-function (MIUF). The MIUF complements the cash-in-
advance (CIA) and the overlapping-generation (OLG) models of money with
more microfoundation. The lasting inﬂuence of MIUF is clearly seen in its
wide adoption in the recent open economy literature (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
1996). It is certainly our hope to see a future adaptation of our investment-
ﬁnancing constraint to real business cycle models, but as a ﬁrst step, we focus
on a continuous time and deterministic setting.
In this setup, we derive a link between the value of the ﬁrm and social
welfare. We ﬁnd that the value of the ﬁrm can be greater with the con-
straint. Our model also sheds light on how the eﬀects of productivity shocks
and investors’ misperception of productivity shocks may be ampliﬁed by the
ﬁnancing constraint. We also discuss shocks such as accounting scandals that
worsen the information asymmetry and shocks that add to transparency such
as improved accounting standards and disclosure rules.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Sections 2.1-2.4 lay out the
model and characterize solutions to the ﬁrm’s value maximization and the
consumer’s utility maximization problems without the ﬁnancing constraint.
The constraint is introduced in Section 2.5, and numerical solutions reported
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses implications from the model and possible
extensions.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider an inﬁnite horizon economy where capital is the only factor of pro-
duction. The representative household is endowed with some initial stock
of capital, k0. Using this capital stock, the household sets up a representa-
tive ﬁrm to produce output and to invest in new capital. The ﬁrm’s output
net of investment will be distributed back to the household to support its
consumption.
2.1 The Firm’s Value Maximization Problem
At any time t,t h eﬁrm uses capital kt to produce output f(kt) and invests
an amount ˙ k + δk (where δ is the depreciation rate). The ﬁrm’s problem is








0 rsds[f(k) − δk − z]dt
subject to : ˙ k = z,
k0 given.
where z is net investment. The superscript o stands for original, emphasizing
the situation without an investment-ﬁnancing constraint. Implicitly, we are
assuming that the ﬁrm borrows funds from banks at a competitive interest
rate rt to ﬁnance its investment. A more explicit discussion about the role
of the banking sector in this model economy is contained in the Appendix.
The ﬁrst order conditions of this problem imply the familiar interest rate
expression as follows:3
rt = f
0(k) − δ. (1)
2.2 The Consumer’s Utility Maximization Problem
The consumer’s problem is simply to choose consumption, c,t om a x i m i z e
his utility subject to the budget constraint that the present value of his


















0 rsdscdt ≤ V (k0).











rsds [f0(k) − δ],
where λ is the multiplier associated with ˙ k = z. The interest rate relation can be obtained
by taking time derivative of the former and equating the resulting expression to the latter.
4Implicit in the budget constraint is the assumption that the household is
the supplier of loanable funds (via the bank at the competitive interest rate
r)t oh e l pﬁnance the ﬁrm’s investment. (See Appendix for details.)







2.3 Equilibrium Firm Value and Consumer Utility
In equilibrium,
˙ k = f(k) − δk − c (3)























To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that an explicit link is estab-
lished between the value of the representative ﬁrm and the welfare of the
representative agent.
In the particular case when f(k)=Akσ, c(k)=[ ρ +( 1− σ)δ]k/σ (see









































where µ is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
52.4 Policy Functions and Numerical Algorithms
For more general production functions, say, f(k)=Akα where α 6= σ,n o
analytical solution is available. Nonetheless we can still derive the diﬀerential
equations governing the policy function, co(k),a n dt h eﬁrm’s value function,
V o(k).
The diﬀerential equation governing the policy function co(k) can be ob-
tained by substituting (1) and (3) into (2):
co0(k)
co(k)
[Akα − δk − c
o(k)] =
αAkα−1 − δ − ρ
σ
. (6)








and diﬀerentiate both sides with respect to τ to obtain,
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(αAkα−1 − δ)V o(k) − co(k)
Akα − δk − co(k)
.
To compute the solutions numerically, we need to shoot back from the
steady state capital stock, k∗,w h e r ek∗ is obtained by combining (1) and (2)








Throughout the paper, we assume that the steady state capital stock, k∗ is
greater than the initial capital stock, k0.






6We need to compute co0(k∗) in order to apply backward shooting methods.





αAkα−1 − δ − ρ
σ [Akα − δk − co(k)]
)
(Akα − δk)

















σ2ρ2 +4 σα(1 − α)Ak∗α−2 (Ak∗α − δk∗)
2σ
, (9)
where the negative root is ruled out by the assumptions of free disposal and
no satiation. Using co0(k∗), we can shoot backward from co(k∗) to obtain
co(k).
As for the ﬁrm’s value function, note that along the steady state path
with k = k∗ and r = ρ, V o(k∗)=( Ak∗α − δk∗)/ρ. Again, we use L’Hopital




(αAkα−1 − δ)V o(k) − co(k)
Akα − δk − co(k)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
k→k∗
=
[α(α − 1)Ak∗α−2]V o(k∗)+( αAk∗α−1 − δ)V o0
(k∗) − co0(k∗)
[αAk∗α−1 − δ − co0(k∗)]
=








[α(1 − α)Ak∗α−2](Ak∗α − δk∗)
ρco0(k∗)
. (10)
Given V o0(k∗), we can shoot backward from V o(k∗) to obtain V o(k).
Lastly, we can compute Io(k) as follows:
I




In this paper, we examine the case where the representative ﬁrm’s investment
is limited by its ability to obtain ﬁnancing. We assume that there is an
implicit, competitive banking sector that provides loans (at the real interest
rate rt)t oﬁnance the ﬁrm’s investment no greater than some fraction of its
net present value, namely,
˙ k + δkt ≤ γV (kt) for any t.
There could be many reasons why the ﬁrm may not be able to borrow
any amount bigger than a fraction of its fundamental value, in particular,
capital market imperfections such as default possibilities and asymmetric
information problems. (See, e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999.)
This ﬁnancing constraint can be viewed as a reduced form representation of
these imperfections that we do not explicitly model in this paper.








α − δk − z)dt
subject to: ˙ k = z,
δk + z ≤ γV (k),
k(0) = k0 given,
and W ≡ V . This problem can be solved as follows. Given any continuous
and almost everywhere diﬀerentiable function V , the maximization problem
is well deﬁned and a function W can be obtained. We can write W = T(V ),
where T is a mapping. Our task is to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point of T.
A rigorous investigation of the problem is an entirely diﬀerent paper. For
instance, to prove the existence of a ﬁxed point, we will need to show that T
is a contraction mapping.5 Instead, we approach the problem in an intuitive
fashion. First, we use the special case of α = σ to derive a special feature
of the ﬁxed point. Then we will construct a value function V displaying the
same feature in general cases.
To begin, note that in the absence of the ﬁnancing constraint, explicit
functional forms of Io(k) and V o(k) are available when α = σ.W ec a ns e e
5Modiﬁcation of standard argument in dynamic programming is required, but what is
essential in the proof of contraction mapping is the discounting: ρ > 0 in continuous time
model and 0 < β < 1 in discrete time model.
8that Io(k) is hump-shaped starting with Io(0) = 0, increasing and reaching a
maximum, then declining and approaching negative inﬁnity as k goes to inﬁn-
ity; V o(k) is an increasing function starting with V o(0) = 0 and approaching





ρ +( 1− σ)δ
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Clearly, if γ is large, namely, γ ≥ ρ/(1−σ),t h e nIo(k)−γV o(k) ≤ 0 hence the
ﬁnancing constraint will never be binding. Let us focus on small γ instead,





















such that Io(kc) − γV o(kc)=0and the ﬁnancing constraint is only binding
when k<k c.
We conjecture that the existence of a critical kc is also true in general. In
fact, we are able to construct such a ﬁxed point, V , for the mapping T.




0 rsds = λ − θ,
and










where λ and θ are the multipliers associated with ˙ k = z and ﬁnancing con-




γV (k) − δk − ˙ k
i
=0 .
6Taking derivative of the ﬁrst condition with respect to t and combining the resulting
expression with the second condition, we get




+ θ[γV 0(k) − δ]+˙ θ
9The consumer’s problem remains the same as before. Therefore, (2) still









0(k)˙ k = rW(k) − c(k) (12)
When k ≥ kc,t h eﬁnancing constraint is not binding so θ =0and the policy
and value functions are the same as in the unconstrained case described in
the previous subsections, with c(k)=co(k),W (k)=V (k)=V o(k), etc.
In what follows, we shall focus on the case where the constraint is binding,
i.e., k<k c and θ > 0.I s t h e r e a d i ﬀerential equation similar to (6) that
governs c(k)? From (3) and the binding constraint, we have
Ak
α − c(k)=γV (k).
Diﬀerentiate this with respect to t. Making use of (2) and (12) and by




















(γ + ρ)c2(k) − ρc(k)Akα
[(1 − σ)c(k)+σAkα][Akα − δk − c(k)]
.
We can compute c(k) by backward shooting starting from kc and c(kc)=
A(kc)α − γV o(kc).




The fact that we make use of (12) and impose V (k) ≡ W(k) in our derivation
of c0(k) above ensures that this V (k) is the ﬁxed point of the mapping T.
Hence the function V that we construct is the value function.
103A n u m e r i c a l e x a m p l e
We surmise that the ﬁrm will invest at a slower rate and probably earn a
lower net present value V (k) with than without the ﬁnancing constraint.
In the absence of explicit analytical solutions, we shall resort to numerical
simulations to better understand the economic eﬀe c t so ft h i sc o n s t r a i n t .
In our numerical solutions, we assume the following benchmark parameter
values: α =0 .36, σ =0 .5, γ =0 .015, ρ =0 .03, δ =0 .1,A=1 2 , and k0 =2 0 .
We ﬁrst compute the policy functions co(k),Vo(k), and Io(k) in the absence
of the ﬁnancing constraint by shooting backward from k∗ to k0. Then, we
use Io(k)=γV o(k) to solve for the critical value kc.7 The corresponding
functions c(k),V(k), and I(k) in the presence of the investment constraint
c a nb eo b t a i n e db ys h o o t i n gb a c k w a r df r o mkc to k0 for k ∈ [k0,kc] (when
the constraint is binding) and combining it with co(k),Vo(k), and Io(k) for
k ∈ [kc,k ∗] (when the constraint is non-binding). The graphs for γV (k)
with and without the ﬁnancing constraint as well as the investment function
Io(k) are displayed in Figure 1.
Not surprisingly, I(k) <I o(k) and, since contemporaneous output is
unaﬀected by changes in investment, c(k) >c o(k) for k<k c (see Figure 2,
panel 2). It is, however, surprising to ﬁnd that V (k) >V o(k).I n o r d e r t o
understand this, it is necessary to also compute the consumption path over
time because the equilibrium value of the ﬁrm is simply the present value of
equilibrium consumption in our model (without the labor-leisure choice; see
budget constraint of the representative consumer).
From the time path of consumption (Figure 2, panel 1), we see that
while consumption under the ﬁnancing constraint initially exceeds its un-
constrained counterpart, it grows at a slower rate and is soon surpassed by
7The time T required for k(T)=kc can be solved from the following diﬀerential
equation:
˙ k = Akα − δk − c(k)
k(0) = k0 given,
k(T)=kc.
11the latter.8 As a result, consumer utility is lowered by the constraint, i.e.,
U(k0) <U o(k0). This may give the impression that V (k) <Vo(k). However,
the ﬁrm’s value also depends on the eﬀect of discounting. We thus have
to consider how the ﬁnancing constraint aﬀects the behavior of interest rate
over time. As shown in Figure 3, panel 2, initially interest rate is signiﬁcantly
lower with than without the investment constraint. The constraint induces a
j u m pi nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ef r o m4% to 5% at the time when the capital stock
hits its critical value and gradually converges to its steady state value (3%)
thereafter. The discount rate at time t (given by
R t
0 rsds), represented by the
area under the interest rate paths from 0 to t, will, at any rate, be smaller
with than without the constraint despite the interest rate jump. It turns
out that this discounting eﬀect dominates the consumption growth eﬀect to
make V (k) >Vo(k) under the set of parameter values we have chosen.






, holds irrespective of the ﬁnancing con-
straint. In terms of this relation, whether σ > 1 or σ < 1, it is possible that
V (k0) >Vo(k0) while U(k0) <U o(k0) provided that c0 is suﬃciently larger
with than without the constraint. When σ → 0, however, V (k0) and U(k0)
will be positively correlated and will both be lowered by the constraint.
The interest rate behavior under the ﬁnancing constraint may suggest
a partial resolution to the Lucas (1990) puzzle why capital does not ﬂow
from rich to poor countries. In particular, the interest rate functions as por-
trayed in Figure 4 indicate that while a 10-fold diﬀerence in capital stocks
b e t w e e nr i c ha n dp o o rc o u n t r i e s( s a y ,k =2 0versus k = 200) could induce
a more than 13-fold diﬀerence in their interest rates (r(20) = 0.535 versus
r(200) = 0.0455) in the absence of the constraint, the interest rate gap will
be signiﬁcantly reduced to 4-fold (r(20) = 0.188 versus r(200) = 0.0455) un-
der the constraint. It may sound tautological that the presence of ﬁnancing
constraint reduces interest rate diﬀerential across countries. In fact, it could
b eg i v e ne m p i r i c a lc o n t e n ti fo n ec o u l dc a l i b r a t ep a r a m e t e rγ to obtain a
quantitative measure of the reduction in interest rate diﬀerential. The re-
8Observe that while the “constrained” consumption function lies everywhere above its
“unconstrained” counterpart, the same is not true for the consumption paths. This is
because capital (of which consumption is a function) will grow more slowly with than
without the constraint. The same logic applies to comparisons between policy functions
of other variables and their corresponding time paths.
12maining diﬀerential can then be attributed to other factors such as political
risk, institutional and trade barriers.
4 Discussion and possible extensions
Our simple model can be easily extended to include labor as an additional
input in the ﬁrm’s production technology and the labor-leisure choice in the
consumer’s utility maximization problem. This extension would allow us
to examine the eﬀect of the ﬁnancing constraint on employment as well –
especially when the constraint does not apply just to investment-ﬁnancing,
but also to hiring workers and footing their wage bills. In the presence of
this more severe constraint, employment and output could both be adversely
aﬀected so that consumption may not surge at the beginning despite the fall
in investment.
This model is cast in a deterministic framework and therefore the follow-
ing arguments on its potential applications to cases with uncertainty are only
suggestive. Nevertheless, we list them here for discussions.
• An increase in total productivity, A, will shift both the γV (k) and I(k)
schedules upward. The impact on investment is not a monotonic func-
t i o no ft h ec a p i t a ls t o c k .A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e5b a s e do no u rn u m e r i c a l
computations, the impact on investment is hump-shaped. This sug-
gests that in the emerging countries, broadly interpreted as countries
with the size of capital between that of the less-developed countries and
the developed, investment is more responsive to productivity shocks A
than in the rest of the world.
• In a deterministic framework, it is easy to detect any discrepancy be-
tween V , the investors’ perception of a ﬁrm’s net worth, and W, the net
worth based on fundamentals. In a stochastic world, there will always
be a discrepancy between the two. Misperception can last for some
time without being refuted by incoming data when capital stock is in a
region where the investment constraint is binding. For example, when
an important innovation such as internet raises the total productivity,
captured by parameter A in our model, no one knows exactly the new
13value of A. If the market estimate AM is higher than the true A,t h ei n -
creased valuation of the ﬁrm’s net worth will allow the ﬁrm to raise the
investment above equilibrium level due to a more relaxed constraint.
As a result, output will be higher, which partially justiﬁe st h er i s ei n
market estimate AM. Because it may take several periods of observa-
tions for the investors to gauge the real impact of the innovation and
the calculation of the fundamental value W involves projection of fu-
ture proﬁts, the discrepancy between W and V may not be statistically
detectable for a number of years. Only when the subsequent earnings
reports of ﬁrms consistently indicate that V is unduly above W would
AM be revised downward. Again, no one knows the correct amount of
downward revision of AM. No doubt that investors’ incentive to make
proﬁts in well-functioning markets ensures that in the long-run, AM
will settle around the true A, but in the short-term, over-shooting on
the upside and downside can occur whenever an important innovation
in general-purpose technology comes to the scene. The magnitude of
the ﬂuctuation in investment depends on the level of the capital stock.
From Figure 6, investment ﬂuctuation is more pronounced in emerging
countries than the rest of the world. To be sure, a logically consistent
model of business cycles would require an explicit probability speciﬁ-
cation of the magnitude and the dynamics of misperception.
• The recent episodes of accounting scandals in the US such as those
involving Enron Corp. and Worldcom Inc. will make investors lower
the value of γ, which will result in tighter ﬁnancing constraint and
hence lower aggregate investment. The congressional eﬀort in tight-
ening government regulations that raise the accounting standards and
make CEO’s action more accountable to shareholders will likely stop γ
from sliding further, hence will stabilize investment. In a full-ﬂedged
RBC model with investment constraint, parameter γ should be cali-
brated to changes in government regulation and supervision in ﬁnancial
markets. For instance, China’s increasing eﬀort since 1996 to adapt its
ﬁnancial markets to international standards in preparation to its WTO
entry will allow the banks to raise γ in their decision to lend to the
private sector, thereby raising investment of private ﬁrms. Thus, even
in the absence of technological change in goods production, institu-
tional changes that ease the problem of asymmetric information in the
ﬁnancing process would mean a higher γ and a less stringent ﬁnancing
14constraint. As a result, capital stock accumulates more rapidly and
as capital stock approaches the ﬁnancing threshold, the investment
volatility eventually become more moderate as argued in the above
paragraph.
• As it can be seen from the discussions above, both a technological
progress and an institutional improvement can raise investment and
output. Traditional RBC models do not distinguish one change from
another. To account separately the changes in A and in γ requires
serious eﬀort in gathering relevant empirical data, for instance the trust
indicator reported in Knack and Keefer (1997) and the survey data on
bank regulation and supervision in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001).
For a developing country trapped in low investment, the priority for
policy changes is likely to be the diﬀerent depending on whether the
low investment is caused by a low A, in which case importing advanced
technologies and ideas is needed, or a low γ, in which case rules and
regulations improving transparency of business transactions are called
for. In the sense of Prescott (1985), here again “Theory is ahead of
business cycle measurement.”
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4.1 A more detailed description of the banking sector
in discrete time
At time 0, the household uses its initial capital k0 to purchase shares of the
ﬁrm and thus becomes its owner. With k0,t h eﬁrm produces f(k0),w h i c h
it pays to the household as dividends. It then borrows I0 from the bank
at the competitive interest rate r0 to ﬁnance its investment. When time
1 comes around, the capital stock grows to k1(= I0 +( 1− δ)k0), yielding
output f(k1). After repaying principal and interest to the bank, the residual
f(k1) − I0(1 + r0) is paid out to the household. A new loan is then raised
to ﬁnance investment I1 at interest rate r1.A tt i m e2, the capital stock
k2(= I1 +(1−δ)k1) generates output f(k2) and dividend f(k2)−I1(1 +r1).
So on and so forth.













[f(k2) − I1(1 + r1)] + ...












Regarding the household, she receives f(kt) − It−1(1 + rt−1) from the
ﬁrm as its shareholder and It−1(1 + rt−1) from the ﬁrm as its debt-holder,
consumes ct = f(kt) − St, and deposits her savings St with the bank.
In equilibrium, supply of loans by the household (St)e q u a l sd e m a n db y
loans by the ﬁrm (It), so that ct = f(kt) − It and the present value of
consumption simply equals the ﬁrm’s value.
224.2 Derivation of U(k0) when α = σ
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